(unfinished)
By Logan Dean
May 8, 2025
Book Review
Jonathan Sarfati, Refuting Evolution
Background
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Analysis
Though it claims on its cover to be “A Response to the National Academy of Sciences’ Teaching About Evolution and the Nature of Science,” Jonathan Sarfati’s Refuting Evolution opens not with a critique of a particular work but with a sweeping generalization: “Many evolution books…contrast religion/creation opinions with evolution/science facts” (p. 15).
Yet in this first paragraph, Sarfati does not name any other evolution books beyond the one he’s supposedly addressing, nor does he propose any kind of definition of “evolution” or what qualifies as an “evolution book.”
Sarfati follows this unsupported generalization with the bold but ambiguous assertion, “Creationists often appeal to the facts of science to support their view, and evolutionists often appeal to philosophical assumptions from outside science” (p. 15).
Immediately, Sarfati manufactures a flimsy “us versus them” narrative costumed as a rational critique. Furthermore, a reliance on vague terms like “the facts of science,” “philosophical assumptions” and “outside science” leaves the reader uncertain about who the “creationists” and “evolutionists” are, or what they could be debating.
Why should what be considered one of “the facts of science” or a “philosophical assumption”? What does it mean to be “outside science”? What distinguishes “religion/creation” propositions from “evolution/science” propositions?
According to Sarfati, naturalism presupposes “things made themselves, that no divine intervention has happened, and that God has not revealed to us knowledge about the past” (p. 16). But saying naturalism excludes these elements is not the same as saying what naturalism is.
Of course, naturalism is not many things. It could be said that “naturalism is not about the Flying Spaghetti Monster,” or that “naturalism is not about knowledge the Flying Spaghetti Monster has revealed to us about the future.” But none of these statements clarify what naturalism is.
Many topics exclude talk about divine intervention and knowledge—supposedly revealed by God according to some particular sacred text—about the past. And according to what processes does an evolutionist think “things made themselves”?
Then Sarfati says evolution “is a deduction from this assumption, and it is essentially the idea that things made themselves” (p. 16). How can an understanding of evolution be deduced from saying what naturalism is not?
The second part of Sarfati’s definition of evolution recycles the same words he uses for naturalism: “things made themselves.” Again, according to what process does an evolutionist think “things made themselves”? And then what steps could show Sarfati’s definition of evolution “deduced” from his definition of naturalism, i.e. “essentially the idea that things made themselves”?
Finally, Sarfati defines evolution as a list of theoretical events framed as “unproven ideas”:
nothing gave rise to an alleged ‘big bang’, non-living matter gave rise to life, single-celled organisms gave rise to many-celled organisms, invertebrates gave rise to vertebrates, ape-like creatures gave rise to man, non-intelligent and amoral matter gave rise to intelligence and morality, man’s yearnings gave rise to religions, etc. (p. 16)
Significantly, Sarfati does not say according to what processes and under what conditions the above could occur, i.e. Sarfati does not say what evolution is. Sarfati also does not say according to what steps the above ideas could be “deduced” from the imprecise principle “things made themselves.” And while Sarfati describes supposed elements of evolution as “unproven,” he does not say why he thinks so.
Instead, Sarfati changes the subject to “the atheistic bias behind much evolutionary thinking”(p. 16). Specifically, Sarfati quotes D.M.S. Watson: “Evolution [is]…universally accepted…because the only alternative, special creation, is clearly incredible” (p. 16).
In fact, saying that evolution is “universally accepted” is an appeal to popularity, i.e. the bandwagon fallacy. And to say that “the only alternative” is creationism is to propose a false dilemma which fallaciously restricts the conversation.
Rather than noting the fallacies in Watson’s statement, Sarfati dramatizes the false dilemma included in Watson’s statement as an “us versus them” narrative: “the biases of the Christian religion versus the biases of secular humanism” (p. 16). But Sarfati has not yet defined “the atheistic bias” or explained how it appears in what Watson said. What is “special creation” and why does Watson consider it “clearly incredible”?
Sarfati also does not say what “the biases of the Christian religion” and “the biases of secular humanism” are. According to what criteria could something be considered one of “the biases of the Christian religion” or “the biases of secular humanism”?
Therefore, undefined biases, according to Sarfati, somehow lead to “different interpretations of the same scientific evidence” (p. 16). But why should what “different interpretations” of what “same scientific data” be defended or examined?
Again, Sarfati changes the subject instead of clarifying his position. Next, Sarfati quotes Boyce Rensberger, labeled by Sarfati as an “anti-creationist” (p. 16). Yet the quote contains nothing about creationism. So how can it be known from what Sarfati provided that Rensberger is an anti-creationist?
What Rensberger said, according to Sarfati, is, “Most scientists get their ideas about how the world works not through rigorously logical processes but through hunches and wild guesses” (p. 17). Without showing steps towards his conclusion, Sarfati deduces from Rensberger’s comment, “It’s not really a question of who is biased, but which bias is the correct bias with which to be biased” (p. 17). But again, what precisely are the biases being defended or examined? What distinguishes “the correct bias” from what other biases?
Again, Sarfati changes the subject: “Actually, Teaching about Evolution admits in the dialogue on pages 22-25 that science isn’t just about facts, and it is tentative, not dogmatic.” (p. 17). What is “the dialogue on pages 22-25”? The Sarfati labels “the rest of the book” as “dogmatic.” What is “the rest” of Teaching about Evolution and how is it “dogmatic” compared to what “dialogue on pages 22-25”?
Again, Sarfati changes the subject to what Richard Lewontin, framed as a “self-proclaimed Marxist” (p. 17). But Marxism is a political ideology unrelated to cosmology. Marx was critiquing industrial capitalist systems in the nineteenth century, not debating how nature has developed on earth or what the first cause of the whole universe may have been.
In the context of Sarfati’s response to Teaching about Evolution, it seems labeling Lewontin a “self-proclaimed Marxist” functions as a red herring and ad hominem.
More important to understanding Sarfati’s position is the charge that something Lewontin said supposedly contains an “implicit philosophical bias against Genesis creation” (p. 17). But what Sarfati quotes of Lewontin’s stance does not include any reference to Genesis creation. And what is “philosophical” about what bias?
If there is some kind of bias in what Lewontin said, according to Sarfati, it may be a firm “commitment to materialism” (p. 18). Lewontin did say “we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door,” but this is not a reference to Genesis creation (p. 18).
Lewontin did promote a principle that excludes the possibility of Genesis creation as a scientific theory of how the universe first came about—i.e. the suggestion to never accept a “Divine Foot”—but why should anyone accept Genesis creation over some other non-material explanation?
Sarfati deduces from what Lewontin said, “Many evolutionists chide creationists not because of the facts, but because creationists refuse to play by the current rules of the game that exclude supernatural creation a priori [i.e. assumed before examining the evidence]” (p. 18).
What are “the facts” that evolutionists should consider? Why should evolutionists consider “supernatural creation”? Sarfati claims, “Many evolutionists chide creationists,” but attributes all “the current rules of the game” to Richard Dickerson (p. 18). And according to Sarfati, Dickerson only listed one rule:
Let us see how far and to what extent we can explain the behavior of the physical and material universe in terms of purely physical and material causes, without invoking the supernatural (p. 18).
Sarfati then adds, “the ‘game’ is extended to trying to explain not just the behavior, but the origin of everything without the supernatural” (pp. 18-19). But Lewontin did not say anything about the origin of everything and Sarfati does not how the game could be further “extended” from what Lewontin said.
And what could be considered the “behavior” of the universe? If the universe exists without God then the behavior of the universe would include a theory of how the universe first existed (although to say it ever “first existed” might be an assumption).
If there is no supernatural, only the universe could be referenced in a theory of the origin of universe, i.e. “the origin of everything.” If there is some supernatural, why should Genesis creation be considered the origin of everything instead of some other creation myth such as the Babylonian Enuma Eilish?
Then Sarfati claims, “Actually, evolutionists are often not consistent with their own rules against invoking an intelligent designer” (p. 19). Yet Sarfati cites only a single scientist, Dickerson, who proposed a lone rule against “invoking the supernatural.” Who are the other evolutionists and what are the other rules?
Moreover, “the supernatural” does not necessarily equate to “an intelligent designer.” How does one know the universe began with an intelligent designer rather than a swirl of autonomous supernatural energies or something else entirely?
Sarfati also equivocates a supernatural intelligent designer with a natural designer, comparing the idea that God made the universe with archaeologists suggesting that people created arrowheads. Sarfati says archaeologists “haven’t seen the designer,” but in fact, they have: they probably know other humans who have showed the creative capacity to make things like arrowheads.
Maybe it is true that archaeologists should not be absolutely certain that humans are the intelligent designers of arrowheads in every case, but humans are probably the best possible explanation given what has been observed of living things so far.
But how do we know? Take computers, for example, which can be observed today. Humans created computers. How did humans create computers? Humans created computers with their minds, bodies and tools.
And how do we know humans make computers rather than something else? We can identify and elaborate on specific parts of the brain, specific parts of the body and specific parts of tools that might be involved in the creation of computers. We can also identify how who created computers when. We can observe humans making computers so it seems humans are the most likely source of every particular computer that can be observed.
The same questions asked about computers sitting on desks can be asked about arrowheads found in the ground. What other living thing could be the intelligent designer of an arrowhead and why should another living thing be considered as a better possible explanation?
Therefore, it seems like humans could probably have used the same abilities every member of the species possesses to create both arrowheads and computers, i.e. humans can be reasonably proposed as the natural intelligent designer of many objects like arrowheads and computers because humans can be observed in the present using their imagination to create similar concepts and using their bodies to apply themselves with certain tools to actualize similar concepts.
On the other hand, who has seen God or anything like God do something and with what abilities? What part of God is for imagining things? What part of God is for making things? Does God also require certain tools to make things?
It might not be insane to suggest God as the supernatural intelligent designer of the universe, but why should that be considered and what would be its function in a theory that tries to describe how the universe exists?
Sarfati claims another contradiction between the evolutionist version of “the origin of everything” and “the whole basis of the SETI program” which is “that a signal from outer space carrying specific information must have an intelligent source.” But like with an arrowhead, the intelligent thing proposed as the creator of a signal from outer space would be imagined as natural, not supernatural.
From alleged contradictions between unrelated topics, Sarfati deduces that “the materialistic bias of many evolutionists means that they reject an intelligent source for the literally encyclopedic information carried in every living cell” (p. 19). Specifically, Sarfati means evolutionists reject a supernatural intelligent source.
Most importantly, even if Sarfati did provide sufficient evidence for believing that there exists “the materialistic bias of many evolutionists,” the burden of proof remains on Sarfati to explain why a theory of “the origin of everything” should include a supernatural element. Merely noticing that some people seem reluctant to consider the possibility of the supernatural is not evidence in itself of the supernatural.
And what distinguishes “the literally encyclopedic information carried in every living cell” from an arrowhead or the SETI program? Why should any intelligent designer, natural or supernatural, be suggested as the maker of any complex thing simply because it is known that some thinking things created other unrelated simple things?
The most explicit “bias” against the God hypothesis Sarfati provides is what Scott Todd, an immunologist at Kansas State University, “declared”:
Even if all the data point to an intelligent designer, such an hypothesis is excluded from science because it is not naturalistic (p. 19).
However, even if it is true that what Todd said is a kind of “materialistic bias,” the existence of materialistic bias is not evidence in itself of the creationist perspective or any other specific alternative to evolution being true.
In fact, Todd correctly described what kind of category science is: naturalistic. Therefore, a naturalistic category by definition excludes non-naturalistic explanations.
If some religion is true, then it could be categorically different than science, i.e. a non-naturalistic category. The possibility of religion being true as a non-naturalistic category could be imagined as coexisting alongside science as a naturalistic category.
Therefore, what Todd said may not be an example of a materialistic bias but simply a statement about what kind of things belong to a particular category. This reinterpretation of what Todd said is not necessarily true but any plausible alternative way of thinking about what Todd said makes Sarfarti’s framing of what Todd said and its implications unnecessary.
If Sarfarti’s framing of what Todd said is unnecessary, then the possibility of there being some materialistic bias is also unnecessary. So to conclude that there exists a materialistic bias in what Todd said is to create a strawman and thus, dilute Sarfati’s broader objection against evolution.